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Executive Summary
Economic growth depends in large part on technological change. Laws govern-
ing intellectual property rights protect inventors from competition in order to
create incentives for them to innovate. Antitrust laws constrain how a monopo-
list can act in order to maintain its monopoly in an attempt to foster competi-
tion. There is a fundamental tension between these two different types of laws.
Attempts to adapt static antitrust analysis to a setting of dynamic R&D com-
petition through the use of "innovation markets" are likely to lead to error.
Applying standard antitrust doctrines such as tying and exclusivity to R&D
settings is likely to be complicated. Only detailed study of the industry of con-
cem has the possibility of uncovering reliable relationships between innovation
and industry behavior. One important form of competition, especially in cer-
tain network industries, is between open and closed systems. We present an
example to illustrate how there is a tendency for systems to close even though
an open system is socially more desirable. Rather than trying to usethe anti-
trust laws to attack the maintenance of closed systems, an alternative approach
would be to use intellectual property laws and regulations to promote open
systems and the standard-setting organizations that they require. Optimal pol-
icy toward R&D requires coordination between the antitrust and intellectual
property laws.
I.Introduction
Over the past twenty years macroeconomists have given renewed at-
tention to the importance of technological change for economic growth.
Since Schumpeter, microeconomists have understood that there may
be a trade-off between achieving static efficiency through competition
and achieving long-run efficiency through optimal investment in re-
search, development, and diffusion of innovation. Recent empirical re-
search in industrial organization demonstrates that the social value30 Canton and Gertner
generated by new goods is large. This suggests that policies that en-
courage innovation, even perhaps at the expense of short-run market
power, may be beneficial.
The traditional roles of antitrust policy and industry regulation have
been to promote static efficiency. Acknowledgement of the importance
of technological change, therefore, raises several important questions
for antitrust policy.1 The questions relate to whether and how antitrust
policy should concern itself with promoting efficient dynamic competi-
tion in technological change, whether and how the static concerns of
traditional antitrust policy should apply in industries with rapid tech-
nological change, and to what extent courts are capable of dealing with
the complexities and uncertainties of technological competition.2
In this chapter, we explore several aspects of these questions. First,
we consider merger policy, one of the most important areasof antitrust
enforcement. One argument that has been put forth is that antitrust
authorities should consider "innovation markets" separately from stan-
dard product markets and block mergers that significantly increase
concentration in such an R&D market. We explain how three condi-
tions are necessary to justify such an expansion of traditional concerns
in mergers. They are: (1) reducing R&D expenditures is undesirable;
(2) if there are fewer firms performing R&D, there will be less aggregate
R&D and fewer new products; and (3) it is possible to determine that
there are not enough other firms to perform R&D and develop future
products to compete with the future products developed by the
merged firm. We argue that there is no general theoretical or empirical
support for any of these three conditions. Therefore, we are skeptical
of the benefits of expanding antitrust merger enforcement to block
mergers that concentrate "innovation markets" as a general policy,
with the important caveat that there may be several special industries
where such a policy may be sensible. Moreover, in some cases certain
types of evidence, which we discuss below, may be available that could
justify blocking a merger.
Intellectual property (IP) policy (patents, copyrights, trademarks,
trade secrets) conveys market power to developers of IP. Antitrust pol-
icy determines, in large part, the constraints society places on compa-
nies with extensive market power. This creates a potential fundamental
conflict between IP policy and antitrust policy. IP policy conveys mar-
ket power; antitrust policy constrains its use. Therefore, any applica-
tion of antitrust policy in R&D-intensive industries should consider
whether it is complementing or thwarting the goals of IP policy. IfIntellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior 31
under current antitrust enforcement, IF policy generates the amount
of market power that creates the optimal incentives for R&D, then any
significant change in antitrust policy towards R&D-intensive industries
could lead to suboptimal R&D investment. At a theoretical level, the
right question is "is it a good idea to change antitrust enforcement and
simultaneously alter IF protection to keep R&D incentives the same?"
But this is a policy adjustment beyond the powers of either antitrust
authorities or the courts.
IP policy and other features of high-tech industries such as network
externalities and economies of scale in R&D make the existence of
short-run market power common. The legal doctrines and economic
analysis that underlie antitrust policy have largely developed without
a focus on dynamic technological competition. Becauseof the preva-
lence of market power in high-tech industries, it is important to un-
derstand the fit between existing policy and the features of these
industries. The proper application of antitrust doctrines such as preda-
tion, tying, and exclusive contracts to high-tech industries is an issue
of significant importance. These issues have received a fair amount of
theoretical attention, so we touch on them briefly and only make some
general observations. We argue that many of the theories that justify
these antitrust doctrines also apply in high-technology companies, but
several additional caveats may apply. First, the factual inquiry may
be much more difficult, requiring courts to make complex and subtle
judgments about disputed technology issues. This makes the process
more costly and more prone to errors. Second,developing workable
rules that provide guidance to companies with market power may be
very difficult.
We also explore the role for antitrust enforcement to affect dynamic
R&D competition that attempts to replace existing market leaders. In
many high-tech industries, competition is inherentlydynamic. A single
technology may be the winner in the marketplace at one point in time.
Competitive forces will then be focused on developing new technology
that can replace the existing winner. Antitrust policy towards compa-
nies with market power did not develop with this form of competition
in mind. The proper role for antitrust policy in making this process
work effectively has received little attention, but may well be the most
important way that antitrust policy can affect competition in high-tech
industries. We consider this question in the context of dynamic, multi-
generational platform competition, where participants can choose be-
tween developing closed and open systems. We argue that winners in32 Canton and Gertner
early stages of competition often have the incentive and ability to close
the system and thereby reduce subsequent competition.
We provide some preliminary thoughts on the role for antitrust pol-
icy to improve this dynamic systems competition. We do not attempt
to develop any standards that enforcement agencies or courts should
adopt, but we do think our theoretical arguments imply that close at-
tention should be paid to conduct that creates a proprietary, closed
system subsequent to open competition. However, policies other than
antitrust enforcement may be more effective instruments to improve
performance. Government subsidization of standards development,re-
duced restrictions on research joint ventures, or other forms of research
coordination where systems are important may be justified. Further-
more, companies that subvert cooperative standard-setting processes
to create their own proprietary, closed systems should face severe
penalties.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II out-
lines the essential features of R&D competition that form the basis for
our subsequent analysis. Section III discusses the role of antitrust en-
forcement for mergers in R&D-intensive industries. Section IV dis-
cusses the scope of monopolization issues in R&D-intensive industries.
In section V we .discuss multigenerational competition amongopen
and closed systems and discuss its implications for antitrust and other
policy. Section VI concludes.
II.Characteristics of R&D Competition for Antitrust Policy
Perhaps the most important single characteristic of technology compe-
tition is uncertainty. Not only is the outcome of any particular R&D
project uncertain, but so is the impact of successful innovation on mar-
kets and competition. Anecdotes abound of an industry being trans-
formed by an innovation coming from completely unrelated industries,
bringing in completely new technology.3 These anecdotes show that
basic research can have unanticipated consequences, and perhaps more
importantly, that the same is true even for very applied, specific re-
search. However, it is possible to make too much of these anecdotes.
We discuss below a growing body of systematic empirical evidence
that much innovation in an industry comes from within it. We note,
however, that these studies define industries broadly relative to the
typical market definition used for antitrust enforcement.Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior 33
All policy towards technological competition should take into ac-
count the inability to foresee perfectly the outcome orimpact of R&D.
The structure of the patent system can be best explained by theinability
of government officials to foresee the influence of particulartechnolo-
gies on R&D activities. The outputs of R&D are ideas. Once anidea is
discovered, the marginal cost to society of using the idea is close to
zero. Without property rights over ideas,good new ideas would be
freely employed. Although efficient after the fact, the result may be no
return for the innovator, reducing the incentive to engage ininnovative
activity. Patents convey monopoly power to innovators,who then can
charge supercompetitive prices for goods that embody the patented
technology and / or license the technology at a price above the marginal
cost of transfer.
If government officials were omniscient, a superior system wouldbe
to subsidize R&D directly or award prizes to innovatorsbased on the
value of the innovation. This would create incentives to engage in inno-
vative activity and avoid the monopoly distortions of the patent sys-
tem. Although we do provide significantsubsidies for R&D projects,
this approach is limited by the enormous difficulty of determiningthe
appropriate size of prizes or direct subsidies to specificprojects.4 Policy
instead is a mixture of subsidies (usually to basic research by nonprofit
institutions), patents, and other forms of property rights.5
A characteristic of technology competition closely related to uncer-
tainty is its dynamic nature. Not only does the processof R&D take
time, but also the goal of technological competition is toreplace ex-
isting technology with new technology, an inherentlydynamic process.
All policy toward technological competition should acknowledge this.
Policy based on static models of competition must be evaluatedwith
great care before applying them to technological competition.
High concentration and short-run market power in the product mar-
kets that use the ideas that result from innovation oftencharacterize
R&D-intensive industries. There are several reasons for this. The first,
of course, is patent or other IP protection. Second, R&D investment is
usually a fixed, sunk cost. The investment will only be justifiedif these
costs can be recovered with the expected rentsassociated with innova-
tion. Many industries other than high tech have significantfixed, sunk
costsfor example, transportation industries such as railroads and
ships; power plants; and many entertainment products such as movies,
music recordings, books, and television production.6 It isprobably no34 Carlton and Gertner
accident that these industries are or have often been regulated, and
many have been the subject of some very complicated and famous anti-
trust cases.
Yet another reason for high concentration in R&D-intensive indus-
tries is demand-side scale economies, or network externalities, whichoccur
when a consumer's value for the product is increased by otherconsum-
ers' presence. Direct network effects can generate thisaconsumer
values a communications network more highlyas more people join the
network. It can also be generated indirectly by supply of complemen-
tary products. For example, the value of a computer operating system
is greater if more consumers purchase the same operating system, be-
cause then more applications will be developed for it. When this hap-
pens, competition among applications is more likely, leading to lower
prices and higher quality, valuable upgrades to the operating system
are more likely, and continued customer support can be expected.
Demand-side scale economies lead to concentration of technology. If
the network effects are large enough, it is difficult for a small, incom-
patible competing technology to survive.
The output of R&Dideasis primarily not consumed directly, but
incorporated into goods and services that are consumed. The previous
paragraphs follow much of the writing in this area by implicitlyassum-
ing vertical integration between the R&D stage and the commercializa-
tion of the innovation. It is possible, and often the case, that a monopoly
patentholder will choose to license its innovation widely. Thispre-
serves downstream competition, although the downstream firms often
face a monopolistically set input price for the licensed technology. Li-
censing to create efficient deployment of a technology can be hampered
by appropriation problems. If a technology has weak or no patentpro-
tection, attempts to license the technology run the risk of appropriation
by potential licensees. If part of the licensing negotiation reveals the
innovation, the potential licensee may choose to reject the offer and
develop goods or services based on the innovation itself. If the risk of
appropriation is high absent patent protection, the innovatormay only
be able to earn a return on its technology by commercializing it and
reaping the benefits of being a first-mover in the market. Appropriation
may still occur, but perhaps only after the innovator has established a
position in the market. Thus, the implicit assumption of vertical inte-
gration is oftn justified in the absence of adequate patent protection.
This suggests an often overlooked benefit of patent protectionitIntellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior 35
allows for efficient allocation of an innovative technology tothe compa-
nies that can use it most effectively.7
Similarly, although network effects lead to a small number of surviv-
ing technologies, the technology need not becontrolled by a single
company. Network externalitieslead to a single protocol for fax ma-
chines, but the protocol is not controlled by a single company, sothere
can be a great deal oftechnological competition among fax machine
suppliers. In many situations, however, companies do competewith
proprietary, incompatible technologies. Then, network effects canlead
to concentration of both technology andmarket power.
We, therefore, do not adopt a view that R&D-intensiveindustries
are inevitably monopolized andtherefore antitrust law can do no more
than favor one monopolist over another. We do believethat R&D-
intensive industries are more prone to market concentrationand the
exercise of market power than most others, that there can besignificant
social value from market power in these industries, but that it is not
necessarily the case that only one technology must survivefor effi-
ciency reasons.
The combination of dynamics, uncertainty, and market powerleads
to one of the most important features of manyR&D-intensive in-
dustriesan important form of competition is in R&D to replacethe
existing technology winner that has static market powerwith an-
other based on improved technology. This form of competition occurs
throughout the computer, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries, as
well as most other R&D-intensive industries. Called creativedestruction
or Schumpeterian competition, it is notthe type of competition that anti-
trust enforcement typically tries to protect,but assuring its efficiency
may be an important role that antitrustpolicy should play in R&D-
intensive industries as opposed to others.8
Another feature of R&D competition is that it may involve redun-
dant investment. Any type of private investment mayinvolve some
degree of rent-stealing from competitors, i.e., part of the return from
investment comes from reducing or eliminating the rentsavailable to
others. This effect may be especially pronounced in someforms of
R&D competition. For example, if two firms followsimilar research
programs to develop a patentable technology, itbecomes a race, and
the advantage to consumers over a single firm engaging inthe research
may be small. Free entry into the race maylead to either too much
R&D or too little R&D, and the division of the resources among com-
peting projects may not be optimal.936 Canton and Gertner
III.Merger Policy in R&D-Intensive Industries
With these (mostly) familiar characteristics of R&D competition in
place, we can now address the role of antitrust policy towards these
industries. In this section, we take on the question of whetheror not
it is appropriate to consider "innovation markets"as distinct from
product markets for the purpose of merger analysis. Gilbert and Sun-
shine (1995) make this suggestion; antitrust authorities have investi-
gated the impact of mergers on R&D; and the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) has blocked at least one merger on the basis of anticipated
reductions in innovation using the concept of "innovation markets."°
Mergers in R&D-intensive industries have become quitecommon in
the past decade. The pharmaceutical industry has had several major
mergers and numerous smaller ones; defense contractors have under-
gone extensive consolidation, as have telecommunications companies.
This is in contrast to the 1980s, when R&D-intensive industries hadnot
been the scene of much merger activity.1'
In a free market economy, a voluntary decision of two firms tomerge
should be made because the firms believe that their joint value exceeds
the sum of their independent values. This is generally because they
believe that there are efficiencies associated with combining thetwo
companies. However, some mergers can lead to a reduction in competi-
tion that causes output to decline and consumer prices to rise." It is
commonly accepted, as a matter of theory, that a reduction in competi-
tion from a merger can have these undesirable effects. Large-scale
cross-sectional studies of the relationship between concentration and
price suffer from severe measurement and causality problems that
make it difficult to assess the general relation between concentration
and pricing. However, there are also several empirical studies of indi-
vidual industries which show that reductions in the number of compet-
itors or increases in market concentration can harmconsumers by
increasing price." Overall, there is both empirical and theoreticalsup-
port for an antitrust policy aimed at preventing mergers that so concen-
trate an existing product market so as to make price increases likely.
Current antitrust enforcement focuses on short-run anticompetitiye
harm. If the antitrust authorities can show that price would rise in the
first two years after the merger, the merger is likely to be enjoined.
Arguments that significant efficiencies will be realized in subsequent
years are likely to have no influence. And for good reason: Antitrust
authorities are acknowledging that predicting the future is hard.Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior 37
Future benefits from a merger, as well as future harms, should be dis-
counted for time and the likelihood that they will actually occur.
Short-run harm to competition is more immediate (by definition), and
probably more predictable.
The potential-competition doctrine takes the small step of logic to
extend antitrust merger review to firms that do not currently compete
but might compete in the future in the absence of the merger. In theory,
the issues are identical to those in a merger among current competitors.
As a practical matter, however, one must predict the effect on competi-
lion in the more distant future. Questions that should be addressed
include: If the merger occurs, will there be more entry by others? Ab-
sent the merger, will the potential competition turn into significant ac-
tual competition? How will competition in the market evolve over the
next several years with and without the merger? Since predictions like
these are quite unreliable and mergers tend to generate efficiency gains,
antitrust regulators should and do set a high standard of justification
for blocking a merger on potential-competition grounds.
If the potential-competition doctrine is a small step in economic logic
from the usual antitrust policy aimed at firms actually competing, then
the innovation market doctrine may seem to be only another small step
further. The only difference between the two doctrines may seem to
be that one is about future competition in an existing product market,
while the other is about competition in R&D which leads to future
competition in current or future product markets. Yet, it is no small
step in logic to reach the conclusion that concentration of an innovation
market is undesirable or that antitrust policy should seek to block
mergers that significantly increase such concentration.
To reach such a conclusion, one must accept the theoretical and em-
pirical validity of the following claims:
Reducing R&D expenditures is undesirable.
If there are fewer firms performing R&D, there will be less aggregate
R&D and fewer new products.
There are not enough other firms to perform R&D and develop hi-
ture products to compete with the future products developed by the
merged firm.
Neither theoretical nor empirical analysis has established the general
validity of any of these three claims N We will discuss each claim in
turn.38 Canton and Gertner
Reducing R&D Expenditures is Undesirable
Since R&D expenditure is an input, not an output, it is desirable only
because it leads to knowledge that ultimately benefits society, as would
occur if new products embodying the knowledge were produced. As
with all inputs, efficiencies can cause output to be produced with less
inputs; a merger that reduces R&D expenditure may be beneficial if it
allows the R&D to be conducted more efficiently. Since competing
R&D expenditures may be duplicative, a merger that eliminates redun-
dancy may lead to the same knowledge produced at lower costs, or
even to greater knowledge at lower costs. The same or increased
knowledge would likely be embodied in the same or greater number
of products, so long as there was no traditional market power problem
with the merger in the consumer market.'5 Other efficiencies beyond
elimination of redundancy could be an enhanced interchange of ideas
and sharing of resources. Although situations where R&D reductions
are efficiency-enhancing may be hard to identify, it is incorrect to con-
clude that any reduction in R&D is necessarily bad for consumers. It
can be a difficult question whether a merger that will reduce R&D
should be blocked, even if the authorities cannot demonstrate a reduc-
tion in output.
A comparison with other sources of cost savings in a merger is use-
ful. We would never say a merger is anticompetitive simply because
it leads to reduced overhead or to labor or materials savings. It would
be necessary to study whether or not there would be output reduc-
tions.16 Possible reasons to adopt a different standard for R&D reduc-
tions from that for other cost reductions are that it may be difficult to
prove the output effect and policymakers may conclude that consum-
ers are generally harmed by R&D reductions.
Indeed, it is very difficult to measure the output from R&D. This is
because the ideas generated are idiosyncratic, their value is hard to
measure, and the R&D process takes time and its outcomes are uncer-
tain. Estimating a production or cost function for R&D would be virtu-
ally impossible unless one used broad proxies, such as patents issued,
for output.
Even if one could show that less R&D would lead to fewer new prod-
ucts, the question still remains whether this is bad for society. It is well
known that competition may result in either too few or too many new
products. Unlike output restrictions, which cause unambiguous con-
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may or may not be desirable. This is recognized in limited patent length
and other aspects of IP policy.
The antitrust treatment of R&D should be viewed in the context of
all aspects of IP policy. Maybe one could have the same amount of
innovation with shorter or narrower patents and weaker antitrust en-
forcement or vice versa. It simply does not follow from any theoretical
argument that, given current patent policy, using antitrust enforcement
to block reductions in R&D is good for society.
There is some empirical evidence on this point.'7 For much R&D, it
appears that the social rate of return exceeds the private one, sug-
gesting that more R&D would be desirable. In addition, the recent liter-
ature on the value of new goods suggests that consumer returns from
innovation are very large. However, the correct question compares the
marginal social return from R&D with the marginal private return, yet
most of our evidence is on average returns. Even if we accept that more
R&D would be beneficial (and we tend to hold this belief), there is no
evidence to suggest that stricter antitrust enforcement is a more cost-
effective way to achieve this than increased patent protection or other
changes in IP policy.
One approach that addresses the possible efficiency of eliminating
duplicative R&D, and at the same time achieves some of the benefits
of competition in the output market, is a research joint venture. Such
a venture can be either open to any firm that chooses to join or limited
to only a few firms. It can provide the fruits of its labors to the partici-
pating firms that compete in the output market. By making the R&D
input available to several rival firms in the output market, some of
the benefits of competition can be preserved. Although structuring a
research joint venture can raise complicated issues, it can be a viable
substitute for a much less competitive output market structure.18 Anti-
trust authorities recognize this and have loosened enforcement against
research joint ventures.
Fewer Competing Firms Will Reduce R&D
There is no consensus in the theoretical or empirical literature that re-
duced competition leads to less R&D and fewer new products. Not all
new technology can be patented, so imitation and reverse engineering
are possible in many industries. For example, some software is pro-
tected only by copyright, so a software developer can legally imple-
ment its own version of innovative features in a competitor's product.40 Canton and Gertner
If imitation is possible, a more concentrated market can permit the in-
novator to capture more of the value of its innovation. In this way,
market concentration could help solve the appropriability problem and
thereby increase innovation.
Patent protection can reduce or eliminate the appropriability prob-
lem, but it does not solve the lack of theoretical consensus on the rela-
tion between concentration and R&D activity. Various theories predict
that competition can have significant influence on R&D activity; the
problem is that the results can go either way. For Schumpeter (1943),
market concentration aids innovative activity because large firms can
absorb the risks and costs of the latter. For Arrow (1962), a competitive
firm will typically have a greater incentive than an established monop-
olist to invest in R&D, since it can gain the entire monopoly profits in
the market while the incumbent will only gain the incremental monop-
oly profit from the iimovation. This holds if the innovator captures the
entire market. However, if an innovative entrant and the incumbent
compete, then the incumbent may have greater incentive to invest to
avoid the lost industry profits associated with duopoly.
Sophisticated theoretical models of patent races show that competi-
tion to discover and patent an invention could lead to too much ag-
gregate R&D expenditure. There are two external effects of increased
R&D investment: it lowers rivals' payoffs, and the innovator does not
capture all the social value of its invention. These two effects go in
opposite directions. The theory remains ambiguous, and the size of
these two effects is difficult to measure in any real setting.
The empirical literature provides no firmer foundation for an anti-
trust policy designed to prevent mergers that will concentrate inno-
vation markets. Although some early research suggested a positive
relation between R&D and concentration, subsequent research has
failed to confirm this result. In an extensive survey, Cohen and Levin
(1989) conclude, "The empirical results concerning how firm size and
market structure relate to innovation are perhaps most accurately de-
scribed as fragile. ...These results leave little support forthe view that
industrial concentration is an independent, significant, and important
determinant of innovative behavior and performance."
In summary, neither theory nor empirical work provides any general
justification for an antitrust merger policy aimed at preserving compe-
tition in R&D markets. They certainly tell us nothing about essential
policy issues, such as at what levels of concentration should there be
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tion that there is no basis at all for an antitrust policy aimed at pre-
venting a reduction in R&D competition? The short answer is yes, but
it is important to note that the empirical literature, for the most part,
relies on cross-sectional studies across industries, which cannot control
for the effect of industry-specific factors. Such studies, like similar ones
for price and concentration, do not provide a sound methodology for
uncovering such a pattern if one exists. Moreover, industries probably
vary too much for one theory to fit all.
This means that a study of an individual industry over time could
find a stable empirical relationship between concentration, R&D activ-
ity, and innovation, all else equal. Indeed, it is precisely the industry
in which the merger is proposed that should be studied to see if a
pattern exists. If no data are available to perform such a study, then
there is no other general economic literature to justify an antitrust chal-
lenge that concentrates R&D. It is precisely when data on individual
industry behavior are available that the economist should try to use
his empirical tools to detect whether there is any effect of concentration
on R&D competition.
The empirical academic literature on the relationship between con-
centration and price has shifted to industry studies over the past
twenty years. In order to identify a relation, there must be time series
or cross-section variation in concentration. In addition, since this varia-
tion is usually endogenous, one needs instruments to identify the effect
of concentration. This has limited the number of industries where such
studies can be done. The data problems are more severe with R&D.
We can think of no good examples where there is useful geographical
cross-section variation in R&Dideas have no geographical bound-
aries, and innovations are typically implemented everywhere. One
could imagine studies across, say, different classes of pharmaceuticals
or defense-related R&D projects, but the differences in the R&D pro-
duction functions could be difficult to identify. Similar problems exist
over timedid R&D go down because concentration increased or
because the opportunities for technological improvements declined?
Thus, although industry studies can be appropriate, we think that they
could well raise difficult empirical issues.
There Are Not Enough Other Firms to Produce the R&D in the
Future
Of the three logical underpinnings for an antitrust merger policy aimed
at preserving competition in R&D markets, this one may be the most42 Canton and Gertner
troublesome. The basic problem is similar to the one that arises in the
application of the potential-competition doctrine, where all future com-
petitors have to be identified in order to determine whether the elimi-
nation of a single one would harm competition. Identifying future
competitors for a known product strikes us as generally pretty hard,
especially as the time period lengthens. Identifying future competitors
for an unknown product is likely to be an order of magnitude more
difficult.
In order to identify an "innovation market," one must include the
innovation activity of all those firms with R&D efforts that might result
in products competitive to the ones that the merged firm may develop.
This means that there typically will be firms in the "innovation market"
who do not currently compete in any way with the firms that propose
to merge. Indeed, because the results of R&D are so difficult to predict,
the analyst may be unable to determine all, or even most, of the rele-
vant firms that might produce competitive products in the future. This
problem becomes more severe the longer it takes before any new prod-
ucts are expected to come to market and the more uncertain and rap-
idly changing is the industry.
Indeed, it is often impossible to predict which industry, let alone
which firm, will develop a particular type of new product. R&D in one
product has frequently led to unpredictable applications elsewhere.
For example, Teflon was discovered as a byproduct during an experi-
ment on refrigerator gases. It has since been used for a wide variety
of applications such as microchip packaging, nonstick coatings, and
artificial arteries.19 Research on dressings for wounds led a researcher
to discover a new coating that leaves fabric waterproof but breathable.
The company, Biotex, that developed this product did so as part of
its research on artificial hearts and is now venturing into the textile
business.'0 In 1988, Wayne Matson developed a machine to analyze
brain chemistry. Soon, it was clear that the machine had other uses,
and it has since been used to identify the components of fruit juices.2'
Corning, a glass company, became a leading supply of telecommunica-
tions equipment based on technology that would have been impossible
to predict before the fact.
These examples illustrate that it can be hard even to contemplate all
the sources of tomorrow's products. How many economists or lawyers
would have predicted even ten years ago that R&D in computers, cable,
and telecommunications would result in products that compete with
each other? The implication is that innovation markets will tend to beIntellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior 43
quite broad, so that it is unlikely in many cases that a merger should
raise concerns about significantly diminishing R&D competition.
Despite the entertaining anecdotal evidence about the serendipitous
nature of innovation, a number of recent studies cast doubt on a general
conclusion that innovation is, on average, serendipitous. Methe, Swa-
minathan, and Mitchell (1996) show that established firms are often
sources of major innovations in telecommunicationsand medicine.
Note, however, that the industry definition of telecommunications
and medicine used in these articles is significantly broader than mar-
ket definitions that are typically used in antitrust policy. Prusa and
Schmitz (1991) show that new firms have a comparative advantage de-
veloping new categories of software, while established firms have a
comparative advantage developing improvements to existing catego-
ries of software. Tether (1998) shows that although small firms have
more innovations per employee, large firms develop moreimportant
innovations. However, Kortum and Lerner (2000) show that venture
capital accounts for a disproportionate share of industrial innovation.
Thus, in some limited circumstances, an analyst may be able to iden-
tify the firms that are likely to be pursuing R&D that will lead to com-
peting products several years in the future. Perhaps in some industries
such as pharmaceuticals, where R&D is becoming more systematic and
there is a regulatory pipeline (e.g., FDA) for approval, or defense prod-
ucts, where government funding or approval is required, such identi-
fication is possible. But the longer the time period, the less reliable is
the prediction. Finally, in those rare cases where the analyst can confi-
dently predict that a merger will lead to a decline in competition in
R&D which, in turn, will lead to a decline in competition in new prod-
ucts, it would seem likely that the potential-competition doctrine could
be used to prevent the merger. The use of that doctrine might involve
applying it to products that do not now exist but will exist in the future
with a high degree of certainty. This seems like a logical and straight-
forward use (or extension) of the doctrine. We prefer the potential-
competition doctrine to the "innovation market" approach because the
former, unlike the latter, focuses on the effects in an output market of
reduced competition (i.e., price, quality, speed of introduction), instead
of the more general and harder-to-predict effect of reduced R&D on
unspecified future products.
Not all R&D is designed to create new products; much R&D invest-
ment is designed to lower the production cost of existing products or
to make incremental improvements in them. In such situations,it is44 Canton and Gertner
more likely that an insider than that an outsider will develop such an
improvement. Although in these markets it may be possible to define
the set of firms that compete in R&D, it is also in these settings that
some of the problems identified in the preceding sections become most
severe. Imagine that two manufacturers of a particular product wish
to merge. There is no direct antitrust problem in the product market,
because there are many other competitors. But the two firms compete
in R&D to produce the product less expensively while none of the other
product manufacturers compete in R&D. It is exactly in a situation such
as this that a merger could increase R&D by reducing appropriation
risk or eliminating redundancy. The impact of successful innovation
on product market competition is also unclear in such a setting. If the
innovation is patented, the diffusion may be the same with or without
the merger. If it cannot be patented, the innovation may be more widely
used if there is a merger.
Application of the Doctrine
The doctrine that mergers can concentrate an innovation market and
harm R&D competition has been applied in merger analysis. One of
the first such cases was the proposed acquisition by ZF Friedrichshafen
AG of the Allison Transmission Division of General Motors. Allison
makes automatic transmissions for certain types of trucks (e.g., refuse
trucks) and buses. ZF also makes transmissions, including automatic
ones, for certain trucks and buses. The U.S. DOT issued a complaint to
stop the merger in November 1993, and the deal then died. In its com-
plaint, the DOJ alleged that the acquisition would reduce competition
in two product markets, one for refuse trucks and one for transit buses.
It also alleged that competition would be adversely affected in the
worldwide market for innovations in automatic transmissions. Spe-
cifically, the DOJ was concerned that ZF would not continue to engage
in R&D in as vigorous a fashion after the merger.
Assume that it would have been possible to allay the competitive
concerns about the two traditional product markets by having ZF li-
cense an independent third party, and further suppose that there were
at least some efficiencies motivating the transaction. The transaction
was stopped in 1993, so consumers have been deprived of eight years
of benefits (indeed, the DOJ can influence the size of the benefits that
consumers receive by the type of license arrangement it accepts). As
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transmissions have emerged from ZF, nor has ZF become a more vigor-
ous competitor. In fact, we understand that ZF has withdrawn form
the refuse-truck market.
We do not want to comment on whether it was wise to issue the
complaint. We simpiy point out that that the benefits from R&D that
were the concern of the DOJ are highly uncertain and difficult to pre-
dict. It is therefore useful to follow this case and others like it, to see
whether consumers ever receive any benefit from the R&D that was
the concern of the DOJ or FTC in blocking a merger and, if so, when.
The expectation of these benefits should be discounted and compared
with the immediate efficiency benefits that could likely have been
achieved by a well-structured settlement. Only by systematically keep-
ing track of the subsequent evolution of industries will we be able to
decide what are good antitrust merger enforcement policies.
IV.Monopolization in R&D-Intensive Industries
R&D-intensive industries are prone to short-run exercise of market
power. Patent protection, economies of scale in R&D, network effects,
and significant horizontal and vertical differentiation all can lead to
some market power. In many situations single technologies dominate
the market, and sometimes a single firm controls those technologies.
Since this is an inherent feature of R&D-intensive industries, it would
be seriously misguided to employ the antitrust laws to prevent the
exercise of market power in these industries. Obviously, not allowing
a patentholder to exercise market power would defeat the purpose of
the patent laws. Even absent patent protection, market power derived
from successful R&D creates incentives for R&D that are beneficial.
Fortunately, it is a basic tenet of antitrust law that monopoly power
is not, in itself, illegal. Only certain categories of conduct designed to
obtain, extend, or preserve monopoly are illegal. The types of conduct
that have been successfully challenged include predatory pricing, ex-
clusive dealing, and tying.
Since we are generally unconcerned about market power initially
obtained through R&D investments, we will focus on the role of anti-
trust policy with respect to conduct that extends or preserves legally
obtained market power in R&D-intensive industries.
Ever since Schumpeter introduced the idea, many commentators
have emphasized that competition in R&D markets is largely about
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power. This dynamic competition has received so much attention that
it has several names: "Schumpeterian competition," "creative destruc-
tion," and, in the context of computing systems, "dynamic platform
competition."
It follows that competition policy in R&D-intensive industries
should focus on the performance of this dynamic competitive process.
Perhaps we should not worry about the exercise of static market power,
or even its exercise over long periods of time, but we should worry
about firms with static market power distorting the dynamic innova-
tion competition for future market power. It does not yet follow, how-
ever, that there is a role for policy intervention in this process, nor does
it follow that antitrust is the best policy tool to regulate this process.
However, we do think it is an area that merits careful analysis and
continued research. We take a few preliminary steps in this section.
A current technology leader with market power would like to earn
as much rent as possible from its intellectual capital for as long as possi-
ble. Many of its activities will affect its ability to sustain its position.
They include investment in R&D to develop product improvements or
next-generation products, long-term contracts with customers, tying
or bundling, changing compatibility with complementary products,
cross-licensing technology deals with potential competitors, and ag-
gressive pricing.
Some of these actions may reduce the likeithood that a competitor
will replace the existing market leader, they may reduce R&D invest-
ments by potential competitors, and they may reduce social welfare.
The correct policy response cannot be that a company that has legiti-
mately obtained market power through its innovative efforts is under
a legal obligation to adopt strategies that (someone believes) are in the
public interest. It should not always be illegal to undertake a strategy
that is in the firm's private interest, simply because there is a different
strategy that (someone believes) leads to higher consumer welfare.
Such a policy would be unworkable, would put an impossible burden
on innovative firms to evaluate social effects of a multitude of strate-
gies, and is completely inconsistent with free market principles.
Throughout antitrust law, courts have identified certain classes of
monopoly conduct as potentially suspect. In most cases, after certain
preconditions are met (such as market power in a well-defined anti-
trust market) courts follow a rule-of-reason analysis. In some situa-
tions, this inquiry will simply try to weigh the anticompetitive harm
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tory pricing, the plaintiff must make a number of specific showings
(below-cost pricing and likelihood of recoupment).
Analyses and arguments over the choice of the best rule for particu-
lar types of conduct have filled volumes of law and economic journals.
Most agree that the factors to consider include the likelihood of incor-
rectly punishing procompetitive conduct vs. the likelihood of failing
to identify anticompetitive conduct, the costs of different types of mis-
takes, the social return from eliminating the anticompetitive conduct,
and the value of explicit guidelines that allow companies to evaluate
the legality of various actions.
The question for us becomes what types of rules should apply to
conduct by a monopolist in an R&D-intensive industry that may reduce
Schumpeterian competition. For many types of conduct, the basic the-
ory underlying conventional antitrust analysis applies to R&D compe-
tition as well. The comparisons are useful. For example, there is a well-
developed theory of exclusive dealing where exclusive contracts can
lead to less-competitive actions by competitors, including reduced
investment, exit, or entry deterrence.Similarly, a monopolist in an
R&D-intensive industry may sign long-term contracts with customers.
This could induce a potential competitor to reduce its investment in
R&D and could occur when a patent is about to expire and the contracts
act to deter effective generic entry.24
Applying the theories of antitrust harm to the R&D setting will usu-
ally create a more difficult factual inquiry. In most cases, it would be
very difficult to develop compelling evidence on the level of R&D
spending by potential competitors in the but-for worldin section III
we argued that it may not even be possible to identify whopotential
R&D competitors are. Even if one could identify the likely R&D com-
petitors and their but-for R&D investments, it would be difficult to
determine the social value of such an investment and compare it with
any efficiency gain. And once again the conflict between monopoly-
power-creating IP policies and antitrust becomes evident. Are we bet-
ter off with patent protection for 20 years and tough antitrust rules that
reduce the likelihood of extending the monopoly through exclusive
contracts, or with patent protection for 17 years and weak antitrust
rules? We have no broad answer to this question. If the conduct has
the effect of stifling the dynamic process of creative destruction, the
social costs may be large and antitrust enforcement seems justified. But
it might be very difficult to know in a particular setting if this is the
case.48 Canton and Gertner
A similar point applies to using the antitrust theories related to tying
and bundling. The theoretical arguments of how tying could lead to
anticompetitive harm include Whinston (1990), Canton and Waidman
(2001), Choi and Stefandis (2001), and Nalebuff (1999). The basic idea
in all these models is that tying makes it more difficult for an entrant
to compete. In Whinston, it may be impossible to get to sufficient scale
to compete in the tied market and thereby allow a monopolist to extend
its monopoly power into the tied market. In Carlton and Waldman
as well as Choi and Stefandis, a similar but dynamic process makes
it more difficult for entrants to compete in the tied market, while in
Nalebuff the pricing advantage of a bundled product makes it more
difficult for an entrant to compete in either market.
The basic competitive effect of the monopolist's strategic behavior
of tying or bundling in these models is reduced investment by a com-
petitor. In an R&D-intensive industry, the strategic conduct can there-
fore reduce competitive R&D investment. As just discussed, applying
an antitrust theory of harm in an R&D setting can be complicated, espe-
cially when the tie involves incorporating additional functionality into
existing products. Again the possible harms from stifling the innova-
tive process will often be hard to weigh against the possible benefit of
raising the return to an innovator, and again the relation between anti
trust policy and IF policy must be considered.
V.Schumpeterian Competition between Open and Closed
Systems
Firms in some R&D-intensive industries have to decide whether to
make their product compatible with complementary component prod-
ucts or to make all components itself. A firm with market power in
one or more components of an open system may choose to close its
system by creating incompatibilities with other products, thereby re-
ducing competitive R&D investment for subsequent generations. This
same choice can appear in non-R&D-intensive industries, but here the
choice could have a great influence on future R&D competition.
The theoretical literature on open vs. closed systems considers com-
petition for a single generation of the technology but does not focus on
competition across many generations. The single-generation models
reveal a trade-off in the choice between open and closed systems. It is
more difficult to win with a closed system against an open system, all
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than mixing and matching the best components across all producers
of open-system components. However, the gains from wirming with a
closed system may be greater because the closed-system provider can
earn greater rents under certain circumstances.
Placing the closedopen-system choice in the context of multiperiod
Schumpeterian competition can change the trade-off significantly. We
use a simple two-period model of Schumpeterian competitionin order
to compare R&D investment incentives between open and closed sys-
tems. Here we present an example of the model to demonstrate how
a leading component firm may choose to close a system inorder to
deter dynamic competition that could replace it. The sole purpose of
the admittedly simple model is to illustrate an overlooked incentive
for dynamic competition to produce closed systems.
Consider the following model. There are three components of a sys-
tem, each of which is necessary for the system to have any value to a
user. For each component, three firms compete todevelop the compo-
nent. Prior to the first period of R&D, firms that research different com-
ponents can merge in order to develop a closed system. If they do not
merge, they each develop a component for an open system.
In period 1, each firm chooses whether or not to invest in R&D. If
it invests in R&D, it develops a component that has uncertain value to
consumers. If a consumer selects an open system, he canmix and match
among all open components. If he chooses a closed system, he must
choose the single element of the closed system for each component.
Consumers are all identical, so each chooses the same system.
We denote the three components of the system by A, B, and C. There
are three firms (subscripted by 1, 2, and 3) with thecapability to de-
velop each component, so there are nine firms overall. In order to de-
velop a component, a firm must incur R&D costs of K; in return it
develops a component that has quality V/3 + 0, where 8 is a random
variable. In our numerical example, 0 is a discrete random variable that
takes on the value -E with probability a, E with probability a, and 0
with probability 1 - 2a. Demand for the system is linear with unit
demand, and the intercept is the total quality of the system, V + °A +
8B + 0, which we denote by Z. If the total price of the system is P,
demand is V + °A + 8B + 0 - P.
Once each firm makes an R&D investment decision, the outcome
becomes known. We assume the following about competition: First, it
is winner-take-all, so the highest-quality system gets the entire market.
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probability 1h. Second, losing firms drop out of the market, so the qual-
ity of their technology does not constrain the winner. (Assume that
there is an additional small cost of product development, so that a firm
with an inferior component chooses not to remain because it will make
no sales.) Third, if there is an open system, each component producer
chooses its price simultaneously and noncooperatively. In equilibrium
each firm charges Z / 4, quantity is Z / 4, and each firm earns profits of
Z2/16. If all three firms for a given component engage in R&D, the
expected quality for that component will equal V/3 + max, 8 where
subscript i indicates a firm. This equals V/3 + 2a(1 - a)E.
Prior to R&D investment decisions, a firm can choose to vertically
integrate and develop a closed system.26 It then develops a closed sys-
tem, i.e, it produces components that are compatible with each other
but incompatible with any competitors' components. A closed system
wins only if the sum of the values of its three components exceeds the
value of the best open system, which equals the sum of the values of
the best three components. Since there are two open firms for each
component and consumers can mix and match to choose the best of
each component, the closed system will be disadvantaged. The ex-
pected quality of a closed-system component is simply the expectation
of a single draw for a component, which is V/3. For example, if a =
/3,the probability of a closed system winning is approximately 0.24,
which is less than the 1/3 probability of winning for each component in
an open system.
Although a closed system is less likely to win, its profits are greater
conditional on winning. The closed-system monopolist will set a price
of Z/2 for the entire system. Its profits will be Z2/4, which exceeds
the entire open system's profits of Z2. If a= 1/3,an open component
has a 50% greater chance of winning, but 25% lower profits conditional
on winning. With these parameters, in a single-period model, the equi-
librium is for all firms to choose open-system components.
However, when one introduces the dynamics of competition, the re-
sults can change dramatically and favor a closed system. To see this
we model a second period of R&D investment. This R&D competition
is Schumpeterian; if a firm invests, then there is some probability it
will develop the technology for a component that surpasses the quality
of the incumbent monopolist's component. There is no issue of compat-
ibility across generations, i.e., there are no consumer switching costs.
Prior to period 2, a winning open-component firm from period 1 may
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In period 2, each firm again chooses whether or not to invest in R&
D. To keep the model simple, we assume that an investment of k gener-
ates a probability 'y that component i will have a value that surpasses
the existing technology by p. If no improved system is developed, con-
sumers will continue to purchase the old system.Again, to simplify
the analysis, we assume that the incumbent and one other firm have
access to this R&D capability for each component.Finally, to avoid the
possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria, we assume that the incumbent
moves first; it has the ability to commit to engage inR&D prior to any
challenger.
This game is subject to well-understood forces. An incumbent has
less incentive to invest as its fear of entry subsides, because it already
earns monopoly rentsit cares only about incremental rents,while the
entrant can replace the monopolist and earn both the incremental and
base monopoly rents. Since the incumbent can move first, however, for
some parameter values it may choose to investin order to deter the
entrant from investment.
For each element of the open system, it is easy to characterize the
equilibrium. For small k, both invest. As k increases, holding all other
parameters constant, the incumbent does not invest and the entrant
does; as k continues to increase, preemption becomes possible, and the
incumbent invests and the entrant does not. For very large k, neither
firm invests.
The key difference between an open and a closed system is that in
the closed system, an entrant for a single component cannot invest in
R&D, succeed, and thereby displace the incumbent unless every other
component's potential entrant also invests in R&D and succeeds. We
assume that each first-generation component is protected by a patent,
so that if a company develops a single new component to compete
against a closed system, it cannot obtain other components to provide
a product to consumers.27 The probability of threeinnovations is y3, so
unless y is close to 1, the likelthood of displacing a closed system is
small relative to displacing at least one element of an open system.
Thus, for some parameter values, there will be R&D investment by
entrants if the incumbent system is open, but there will be no R&D
investment by entrants if the incumbent system is closed. Closing a
system could lead to dramatic reductions in dynamic innovation com-
petition.
If the closed system is unchallenged, the incumbent monopolist
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innovation. Since it does not reap all the benefits of product improve-
ment, there wifi be less R&D investment than is socially desirable. An
open system is likely to lead to more competitive innovation, but the
level of innovation could be socially excessive. The motivation of substi-
tuting oneself for the existing monopolist as the recipient of existing
monopoly profits is rent-seeking that has no social value. However, the
only way to do this is to engage in socially valuable innovative activity.
In many settings, it is possible to convert an open system to a closed
system by imposing incompatibilities at low cost. In our model, after
the winning components are determined in the first stage of R&D com-
petition, the winning firms could choose to create a closed system
through vertical integration or contractually. If possible, this would
allow them to deter competitive innovation without having to bear the
heightened risk associated with developing a closed system in the first
stage.
One way to interpret the model is in terms of externalities. The bene-
ficiaries of open systems are future consumers and firms that will have
R&D opportunities in the future. If all of these parties could get to-
gether to provide appropriate subsidies and coordinate R&D efforts,
efficient displacement of the closed-system monopolist would occur.
Such coordination is, of course, impossible. The result is that too little
investment in displacing a closed system may occur and that there may
be an incentive for open-system suppliers to coordinate and close their
system.
The model is most similar in structure to Nalebuff's papers on bun-
dling.28 These papers focus on the difficulty for a single-product pro-
ducer to compete against a bundled product. In his model, there are no
complementarities in demand, but pricing strategies by the incumbent
make single-product entry less profitable and play a similar role to the
independent uncertainties of R&D that drive our model.
There are a number of possible extensions to the model. It may be
extreme to assume that innovation in all three components is necessary
to replace the existing technology. If one develops a much superior
single component, it may be possible to use nonproprietary technology
for the other components. This may reduce the advantage of a closed
system, but not eliminate it completely. The closed-system monopolist
will have an incentive to devote significant resources to R&D for any
component where significant competition exists. Such a monopolist has
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nerable. A single-component competitor will generate external benefits
for other component firms; unless they can coordinate and subsidize
the innovative firm, the incumbent's advantage and ability to deter
remain. In addition, the incumbent could try to acquire any firm that
is successful and incorporate the component into its system.
Open systems have additional consumer benefits when there is hori-
zontal differentiation among components. Variety of components that
are compatible can add significant value. This may be another source
of welfare loss from closing a system.
The model implies that the benefits to winning with a closed system
may be largeshort-run and long-run market power without the need
to invest too heavily in R&D to maintain one's position. This suggests
that firms could devote enormous resources to the competition to have
the winning closed system. The model does not allow variable lev-
els of R&D investment. In a richer model, the efficiency question is
whether this compensates for the welfare losses from the closed sys-
tem. There are several reasons to think that it would not. First, there
may be significant diminishing returns of consumer benefits and per-
haps even of the private benefit from incremental spending on R&D
or marketing to become the initial winner. If the former is the case,
consumers do not benefit much from the intense competition to be the
monopolist. If the latter is the case, expenditures may not be too large.
Second, if initial R&D is very uncertain, no firm may try to innovate
with a closed system, because the probability of beating a mix-and-
match open system would be too small. Each firm will instead develop
single components or several components as part of an open system.
However, if at any point one company dominates an important compo-
nent of the open system, it may have the ability to develop a winning
closed system at low cost. If it is technologically possible to take the
winning component and develop proprietary interfaces with other
components, then the firm could acquire or develop the other compo-
nents. The component producers, fearing obsolescence, may be willing
to sell out at a low price.
We have developed a story of how Schumpeterian competition be-
tween closed and open systems could result in too little innovation and
continued exercise of static market power. If one accepts the logic of
the basic story, the next question is whether or not antitrust policy
should play a role in improving performance. Although the model sug-
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the exact role for antitrust is not straightforward. It is first necessary
to define the conduct that is suspectthe government certainly cannot
simply prohibit offering a closed system, nor can investing a great deal
in R&D to make the system better than rivals be illegal. In many cir-
cumstances, closed systems may create consumer value by allowing
more effective coordination among components, and competition to
become the winning closed system may be effective. Furthermore, the
determination of the optimal level of R&D remains elusive, so it does
not follow that simply because creation of a closed system may reduce
R&D, the new level of R&D is less than optimal.
One type of conduct that possibly could present an antitrust problem
is actions a firm with market power takes to make a system closed or
more closed.29 Yet the rule-of-reason analysis needed would be very
difficult and require a great deal of technical sophistication of the
courts. Antitrust laws may be too crude a policy tool for dealing with
these problems. Maybe subsidies for maintaining open systems or for
open-standard-setting organizations would be more effective.
A second set of policies that may be justified are those which pro-
mote open systems, perhaps through limited subsidies, tax benefits,
lessened antitrust restrictions on institutions that promote standards,
and increased antitrust scrutiny of conduct that subverts such institu-
tions. Standard setting can be a critical element in having an open sys-
tem. Therefore, the strategic subversion of the standard-setting process
can be especially harmful to competition between open and closed sys-
tems. In several recent court cases, companies have alleged that a rival
participated in deliberations of collective standard setting in an effort
either to obtain information to file patents that could then be asserted
against those adhering to the standard or to encourage adoption of a
technology for which they already had patent rights.30 These acts oc-
curred despite the reliance upon each other by firms in the standard-
setting process to assure that the standards raised no patent issues. The
subversion of the setting of open standards can defeat their purpose
and could make it impossible for open systems to survive in competi-
tion with closed systems.
IP policy could play a significant role as well. Restrictions on the
ability to patent certain types of interfaces or limitations on how such
a patent can be enforced may be justified. In addition, government
subsidies for research could include requirements for some degree of
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VI.Conclusion
Economic growth depends in large part on technological change. Laws
governing IP rights protect inventors from competition in order to cre-
ate incentives for them to innovate. Antitrust laws constrain how a
monopolist can act in order to maintain its monopoly in an attempt
to foster competition. Antitrust doctrines have for the most part been
developed with a static setting in mind. There is a fundamental tension
between these two different types of laws. Attempts to adapt static
antitrust analysis to a setting of dynamic R&D competition through
the use of "innovation markets" are likely to lead to error. Applying
standard antitrust doctrines such as tying and exclusivity to R&D set-
tings is likely to be complicated. Only detailed study of the industry
of concern has the possibility of uncovering reliable relationships be-
tween innovation and industry behavior. One important form of com-
petition, especially in certain network industries, is between open and
closed systems. We have presented an example to illustrate how there
is a tendency for systems to close even though an open system is so-
cially more desirable. Rather than trying to use the antitrust laws to
attack the maintenance of closed systems, an alternative approach
would be to use IP laws and regulations to promote open systems and
the standard setting organizations that they require. Recognition that
optimal policy toward R&D requires coordination between the anti-
trust and IF laws is needed.
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This is an extreme assumption that helps illustrate the basic point dramatically. The
assumption can be weakened and the same basic forces will still apply. We discuss this
point briefly below.
See Nalebuff (1999, 2000).
Economides and White (1994) discuss antitrust implications of closing a system and
explain its relationship to tying and exclusive dealing. They do not focus on the impact
of closing a system on innovation.
See, e.g., Micron Technology Inc. v. Rambus Inc., U.S. District Court for District of Dela-
ware, Civil Action No. DO-792; Rambus Inc. v. InJineon Technologies, U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond, Civil Action No. 3:00 CV 524; and FTC
v. Dell Computer Corp., 121 FTC 616. Carlton has served as an expert for Infineon and
Micron.
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